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WHO’S THE BOSS: THE DEFINITION OF A SUPERVISOR 
IN WORKPLACE HARASSMENT UNDER 
VANCE V. BALL STATE UNIVERSITY 
INTRODUCTION 
Yasharay Mack works as a mechanic for the Otis Elevator Company.1 She 
is assigned to work at the Metropolitan Life building in New York City.2 
James Connolly, another employee of the company, holding the position of 
“mechanic in charge,” also works at this site.3 Connolly is the senior employee 
at the site and has the authority to direct Mack’s work activities, but does not 
have the power to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline her.4 
While at work, Connolly frequently makes sexual comments to Mack, 
regularly changes out of his uniform in front of her, constantly boasts about his 
sexual exploits, and has even pulled her onto his lap while trying to kiss her.5 
Mack decides she wants to sue, claiming sexual harassment; how likely is the 
company to be held liable?6 
Before June 2013, the answer to this question mostly depended on which 
court heard the case.7 According to the Second Circuit in Mack v. Otis 
Elevator, it is very likely the company would have been held liable.8 The 
Second Circuit defines a “supervisor” as someone who not only has the ability 
to take or recommend tangible employment actions against an employee, but 
could also have the ability to control an employee’s daily activities.9 However, 
if this case were brought before the Seventh Circuit, the company likely would 
 
 1. Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 120, 126; see also Jodi R. Mandell, Mack v. Otis Elevator: Creating More 
Supervisors and Vicarious Liability for Workplace Harassment, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 521, 525 
(2005). 
 5. Mack, 326 F.3d at 120. 
 6. Id. at 122. 
 7. See infra notes 8–10 and accompanying text. 
 8. Mandell, supra note 4, at 522. In Mack v. Otis Elevator, the case which the situation 
described above is based on, the Second Circuit broadly interpreted the term “supervisor” to 
apply to those who had the authority to create a hostile work environment. Id. 
 9. Keith Muse, Seeking Supervision: An Analysis of Recent Trends in the Definition of 
‘Supervisor’ Argument and a Recommendation for the Eleventh Circuit, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 
491, 491–92 (2005). 
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not have been held liable because Connolly did not have the power to take 
tangible employment actions against Mack.10 
The reason for the conflicting results for liability in the above situation was 
a direct result of the holdings from Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and 
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.11 In those cases, the Supreme Court held that 
an employer is presumptively liable when an employee’s “supervisor” creates 
a sexually hostile work environment but failed to define what qualified 
someone as a “supervisor” or address liability standards for other kinds of 
workers.12 Subsequently, when hearing hostile environment claims, the lower 
courts decided that when the alleged harasser was considered a co-worker, and 
not a supervisor, the aggrieved employee had to prove the employer was 
negligent in handling the situation for vicarious liability to attach.13 Therefore, 
by opting for a negligence standard, the courts incentivized employers to argue 
that the alleged harasser was not actually a supervisor, which was the decision 
the Supreme Court failed to provide guidance for, and made the determination 
of the alleged harasser’s status paramount to the situation.14 
Following Ellerth and Faragher, the circuits were undoubtedly split on 
deciding what should qualify someone as a “supervisor” under Title VII, with 
the Seventh and Eighth Circuits applying a rather “extreme position” and other 
circuits adopting the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s position.15 
Generally, the EEOC’s broad position is that for Title VII purposes the 
definition of a “supervisor” includes those who have the limited authority to 
only direct another employee’s daily tasks, workload, and activities, drawing 
the line well before the ability to take tangible actions.16 This circuit split 
 
 10. Id. This approach taken by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals is known as the 
“narrow view.” Id. at 492. 
 11. See, e.g., Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of 
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
 12. Stephanie Ann Henning Blackman, The Faragher and Ellerth Problem: Lower Courts’ 
Confusion Regarding the Definition of “Supervisor,” 54 VAND. L. REV. 123, 124 (2001). Even 
though Ellerth and Faragher addressed sexual harassment issues, the courts have since applied 
these holdings to other types of hostile environment claims as well, including race-based claims. 
Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2442 n.3 (2013). 
 13. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2440–41; see, e.g., Williams v. Waste Mgmt. of Ill., 361 F.3d 1021, 
1029 (7th Cir. 2004); McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1119 (9th Cir. 2004); Joens 
v. John Morrell & Co., 354 F.3d 938, 940 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 14. See Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2437 (“Under Title VII, an employer’s liability for workplace 
harassment may depend on the status of the harasser.”). 
 15. Catherine L. Fisk, Supervisors in a World of Flat Hierarchies, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1403, 
1406–07 (2013). 
 16. See EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: VICARIOUS EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR 
UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT BY SUPERVISORS (1999), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/ 
docs/harassment.html. 
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would finally be resolved when the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Vance 
v. Ball State University.17 
In Vance v. Ball State University, the Supreme Court addressed the 
question it had left open fifteen years prior in Ellerth and Faragher of who 
qualifies as a “supervisor” in cases where an employee asserts a Title VII claim 
for workplace harassment.18 Resolving the diverging views, the Supreme Court 
held in Vance that an employee is a “supervisor” for purposes of vicarious 
liability under Title VII if they are empowered by the employer to take 
“tangible employment actions” against the victim.19 
Therefore, in Vance, the Court chose the restrictive “supervisor” definition, 
which ties supervisor liability to the ability to exercise significant control.20 
This Note argues that the difficulty the majority and dissenting opinions in 
Vance v. Ball State University had in defining who should qualify as a 
“supervisor” proves that the distinction between supervisors and co-workers is 
impracticable for Title VII purposes. This Note then proposes a unitary, 
alternative standard. 
This Note initially provides an overview of employment discrimination 
law under Title VII and gives a background on important decisions prior to the 
judgment in Vance, highlighting the landmark holdings from Ellerth and 
Faragher. It continues by analyzing the procedural history of the Vance case, 
along with a recitation of the relevant facts. Additionally, a discussion 
concerning the majority opinion written by Justice Samuel Alito21 will be 
followed by a discussion regarding the vigorous dissent penned by Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg.22 Culminating, this Note will propose an alternative solution 
to addressing hostile work environment claims under Title VII, setting forth a 
standard that discards the need to differentiate between supervisors and co-
workers, and discuss the possible implications. Concluding, there will be a 
brief recapitulation of the issue and why the new proposal will prove to be a 
logical resolution. 
I.  DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it an “unlawful 
employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
 
 17. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2443. 
 18. Id. at 2439. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See id. at 2443. 
 21. Id. at 2439. 
 22. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2454. 
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origin.”23 Employees who suffer discrimination are able to recover damages or 
other remedies from their employers.24 Moreover, Title VII clearly prohibits 
discrimination in regards to employment actions that have direct economic 
consequences, such as discharges, demotions, and pay cuts, but there was 
confusion regarding whether it reached discrimination that did not directly 
result in economic misfortune.25 Shortly after the enactment of Title VII, some 
of the lower federal courts addressed this confusion and held Title VII to reach 
the “creation or perpetuation of a discriminatory work environment.”26 
A. Rogers Lays the Groundwork 
Legal scholars regularly cite Rogers v. EEOC as the first case to recognize 
a hostile work environment as a form of illegal employment discrimination, 
particularly for racial discrimination.27 In that case, a Hispanic employee 
alleged that her employers, two optometrists, segregated their patients by 
color-coding their office forms by race, using red ink for Black customers and 
blue ink for non-Black customers.28 The EEOC, on behalf of the plaintiff, 
argued that even though the actions were not directed at the plaintiff, they 
“could ‘create an atmosphere that would adversely affect the terms and 
conditions of her employment.’”29 In the holding, the Fifth Circuit believed 
that it must be “acutely conscious of the fact that Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 should be accorded a liberal interpretation in order to effectuate 
the purpose of Congress to eliminate the inconvenience, unfairness, and 
humiliation of ethnic discrimination.”30 Exercising this “liberal interpretation,” 
the court went on to say that “the phrase ‘terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment’ in [Title VII] is an expansive concept which sweeps within its 
protective ambit the practice of creating a working environment heavily 
charged with ethnic or racial discrimination.”31 However, the Fifth Circuit was 
quick to establish that this holding did not apply to an employer’s “mere 
utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet” that may offend an employee or group 
of employees.32 But by the same token, the Rogers court explained that a 
discriminatory atmosphere under certain circumstances could constitute an 
 
 23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2006). 
 24. Id. § 2000e–5(g). 
 25. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2440. 
 26. Id.; see also infra notes 27–34 and accompanying text. 
 27. See, e.g., Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971); see also Pat K. Chew & Robert 
E. Kelley, Unwrapping Racial Harassment Law, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 49, 50–51 
(2006). 
 28. Chew & Kelley, supra note 27, at 55. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
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unlawful employment practice.33 Specifically, the Fifth Circuit held that “[o]ne 
can readily envision working environments so heavily polluted with 
discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological 
stability of minority group workers, and [we] think Section 703 of Title VII 
was aimed at the eradication of such noxious practices.”34 
B. The Supreme Court Recognizes a Hostile Work Environment 
In light of the Rogers decision, lower courts began holding that, in a charge 
of a racially hostile work environment, the employer is liable only if the 
injured party can prove that the employer was negligent, i.e., that the employer 
knew or should have known about the harassment and failed to take remedial 
action.35 This issue of vicarious employer liability ultimately reached the 
Supreme Court in 1986, in the case of Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 
but the Court declined to decide it.36 Instead, the Court focused their holding 
on finding that a claim of “hostile environment” sex discrimination is 
actionable under Title VII.37 
The Supreme Court in Meritor gave credit to the Fifth Circuit for first 
recognizing a cause of action based on a discriminatory work environment in 
Rogers.38 On an interesting side note, the Court incorrectly recalled Rogers as 
involving a Hispanic employee complaining that her employers discriminated 
against their “Hispanic clientele,”39 when in fact, the case involved a Hispanic 
employee complaining about discrimination towards the Black clientele.40 
Regardless of this oversight, the Court readily applied the established principle 
for racial harassment to sexual harassment, noting that “[n]othing in Title VII 
suggests that a hostile environment based on discriminatory sexual harassment 
should not be likewise prohibited.”41 However, the Court failed to articulate 
exactly what factors it considered in deciding whether the alleged harassment 
actually constituted a hostile work environment.42 The Supreme Court 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 767–69 (1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(citing to a string of cases in support of this proposition). 
 36. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). The issue in Meritor was 
raised not in the context of racial discrimination, but rather sexual harassment, which has 
subsequently become the focus of discriminatory harassment jurisprudence. Id. at 65–66; see also 
infra notes 46–48 and accompanying text. 
 37. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 73. 
 38. Id. at 65. 
 39. Id. at 65–66. 
 40. Chew & Kelley, supra note 27, at 55. 
 41. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66. 
 42. Shannon Murphy, Note, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson: What Makes a Work 
Environment “Hostile”?, 40 ARK. L. REV. 857, 864 (1987). 
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provided some clarity, but not much more, in regard to what specifically 
constituted a hostile work environment in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.43 In 
that case, the Court held that the workplace needed to be permeated with such 
severe or pervasive discrimination that it altered the conditions of the victim’s 
employment and created an abusive working environment.44 Explaining this 
standard, the Court stated that it took a “middle path between making 
actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the conduct to 
cause a tangible psychological injury.”45 
II.  THE LANDMARK DECISIONS 
First and perhaps foremost, the Meritor decision is additionally critical for 
what the Supreme Court declined to decide. The parties in that case wanted a 
definitive ruling on vicarious employer liability, but the Court refused to do so, 
expressly declining to create a general standard for employer liability in Title 
VII sexual harassment cases.46 In coming to this conclusion, the Court felt the 
record was too bare for such an impactful ruling, as the district court did not 
resolve the conflicting testimony about the true existence of a sexual 
relationship between the employee and her supervisor.47 More specifically, the 
Court did not know “whether [the supervisor] made any sexual advances 
toward respondent at all,” let alone how pervasive or serious they potentially 
were.48 In light of the bare factual record, the Court still discussed in dicta the 
employer’s potential liability, just as the district and appellate courts had done 
before.49 In doing so, the Court agreed with the EEOC and Congress and 
wanted courts to look at agency principles for guidance in these situations.50 
Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, the Court endorsed the idea that 
employers are not always automatically liable for sexual harassment by their 
supervisors.51 
 
 43. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993). 
 44. Id. at 21. 
 45. Id. (“Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or 
abusive work environment—an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or 
abusive—is beyond Title VII’s purview.”) 
 46. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). 
 47. Id. at 61, 72. 
 48. Id. at 72. 
 49. Id. at 69–70. 
 50. Id. at 72. The EEOC’s argument was presented by an amicus brief and highlighted that 
Congress has focused on directing courts to be guided by agency principles when hearing issues 
of employer liability. Ronald Turner, Employer Liability Under Title VII for Hostile Environment 
Sexual Harassment by Supervisory Personnel: The Impact and Aftermath of Meritor Savings 
Bank, 33 HOW. L.J. 1, 29 (1990). 
 51. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. 
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A. Ellerth and Faragher: The Framework 
Twelve years later, on the last day of the 1997–1998 term, the Supreme 
Court further developed this area, fashioning an intelligible vicarious liability 
rule for employers when their supervisors harass their employees.52 The 
holding was first articulated in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and was 
subsequently adopted later that same day in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.53 
1. Crafting an Affirmative Defense 
The Court explained that when no tangible employment action is taken, the 
employer is presumptively liable for a supervisor’s harassment that results in a 
hostile work environment.54 The defending employer, nonetheless, may raise 
an affirmative defense to liability or damages, and must prove that the 
employer took reasonable measures to prevent and remedy the harassment and 
that the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of those measures.55 
However, when the supervisor’s harassment culminates in a discharge, 
demotion, or undesirable assignment—basically any tangible employment 
action—no affirmative defense is available, and the employer is automatically 
vicariously liable.56 
The Court believed that by limiting liability for employers who 
implemented anti-harassment procedures, Title VII’s “‘primary objective’” of 
preventing workplace discrimination was being satisfied.57 Conceivably, this 
limited liability was thought to incentivize the development of effective sexual 
harassment policies, and, thus, would have an ultimate positive effect on 
preventing workplace discrimination.58 
2. Applying Agency Principles 
In coming to a conclusion, the Court looked to agency principles as the 
Meritor decision previously instructed.59 First, the Court alluded to section 
219(1) of the Restatement of Agency that defines the principle of agency law 
as “[a] master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed 
while acting in the scope of their employment.”60 In essence, an employer may 
 
 52. Michael C. Harper, Employer Liability for Harassment Under Title VII: A Functional 
Rationale for Faragher and Ellerth, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 41, 41 (1999). 
 53. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of 
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 802 (1998). 
 54. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765, 767 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 55. Id. at 765. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: The Ellerth and Faragher Affirmative 
Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 206–07 (2004). 
 58. Id. at 207. 
 59. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 755. 
 60. Id. at 755–56 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
946 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:939 
be held liable for both the negligent and intentional torts committed by 
employees within the scope of their employment.61 Intentional torts can fall 
under the “scope of employment” umbrella when the conduct is “‘actuated, at 
least in part, by a purpose to serve the [employer],’ even if [the conduct] is 
forbidden by the employer.”62 However, as it has been commonly recognized, 
the general rule is that sexual harassment by a supervisor does not qualify as 
conduct within the scope of employment.63 
Even though sexual harassment is found to fall outside of the scope of 
employment, the Court noted there are other agency principles that could 
define the basis for employer liability.64 In these situations, where the conduct 
falls outside of the scope of employment, the Court turned to section 219(2) of 
the Restatement of Agency, and particularly subsections (b) and (d).65 Under 
subsection (b) an employer is liable when the tort is traceable to the employer’s 
own negligence, and thus, even though the harassment was outside of the 
scope of employment, the employer can be liable.66 Under subsection (d), the 
concern is vicarious liability for torts committed by an employee when the 
employee was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency 
relationship.67 However, the Court realized that, in a sense, most workplace 
tortfeasors are aided in their tortious activity by the existence of the agency 
relationship.68 The Court found this to be too broad and decided that the 
“agency in relation” standard required the existence of something more than 
simply the relationship itself.69 
Initially, the Court determined a class of cases where more than the 
existence of an employment relationship aided in the harassment—when a 
supervisor’s harassment results in tangible employment actions.70 To recap, a 
“tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in employment 
status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with 
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant 
change in benefits.”71 Therefore, it logically follows that when a supervisor 
makes a tangible employment decision, it is axiomatic that the injury could not 
 
 61. Id. at 756. The Court provided the example that when a salesperson lies to a customer in 
order to make a sale, the tortious conduct is within the scope of employment because it benefits 
the employer by increasing sales, even though it may violate the employer’s policies. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 756–57. 
 64. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 758–59. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 760. 
 69. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 761. 
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have resulted absent the agency relationship, and thus the decision vicariously 
becomes the act of the employer.72 
What is far more difficult to determine is whether the agency relationship 
aids in the supervisor’s harassing activities that do not result in a tangible 
employment action.73 The Court looked to accommodate both the principles of 
vicarious liability for harm caused by the inappropriate use of supervisory 
authority and Title VII’s underlying policies of encouraging employer’s to 
create policies that help prevent this type of conduct.74 Thus, the Court came to 
its final conclusion, holding that employers are strictly liable for their 
supervisor’s harassing conduct that results in tangible employment actions and 
are presumptively liable when the acts result in a hostile work environment.75 
However, an employer can raise an affirmative defense that the employer took 
reasonable measures to prevent and remedy the harassment and the employee 
unreasonably failed to take advantage of those measures to rebut said 
presumption.76 Later that same day, the Court applied this new framework in 
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.77 As a result of this new framework, it is 
critical whether the harasser is a “supervisor or simply a co-worker.”78 
Accordingly, in a hostile work environment case, whether the alleged harasser 
is a supervisor or not has a determinative impact on the elements that the 
plaintiff must prove and the defenses available to the defendant.79 
3. Leaving the Door Open 
Even though the distinction between a supervisor and a co-worker is vital 
in applying the Ellerth and Faragher standard, those holdings still left open the 
question of who exactly qualifies as a supervisor.80 Looking at the facts of each 
case, it becomes apparent why the Court left this question open—the status of 
the alleged harassers was never in dispute.81 In Ellerth, the alleged harasser, 
Ted Slowik, was a supervisor “under any definition of the term.”82 Slowik, a 
 
 72. See id. at 762. 
 73. Id. at 763. 
 74. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998). 
 78. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013). 
 79. Browne v. Signal Mountain Nursery, L.P., 286 F. Supp. 2d 904, 910 (E.D. Tenn. 2003). 
Furthermore, the court stated that it was “of great benefit to defendants for the harasser to be a co-
employee rather than a supervisor.” Id. at 910 n.2. 
 80. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2439. 
 81. Id. at 2446. In the Vance dissent, however, Justice Ginsburg believed that one of the 
harassers in Faragher, David Silverman, should not have qualified as a supervisor, as he did not 
wield enough authority. Id. at 2458 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 82. Id. at 2446 (majority opinion); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 747 
(1998). 
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midlevel manager, had the authority to make hiring and promotion decisions.83 
In Faragher, the plaintiff, a lifeguard, accused two fellow employees of 
harassment.84 It was fundamentally certain that Bill Terry qualified as the 
plaintiff’s supervisor, as he served as the Chief of the Marine Safety Division 
and had the authority to hire new lifeguards, supervise all aspects of the 
lifeguards’ work assignments, and discipline the staff, among other duties.85 
David Silverman provided a more curious case, as he was only responsible for 
making the lifeguards’ daily assignments and supervising their work and 
fitness training.86 Even though Silverman’s status was debatable, the employer 
never argued against the plaintiff’s characterization of both men as 
“supervisors,” and, thus, the Court did not address that aspect.87 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court successfully resolved the issue regarding 
the correct standard of vicarious liability in hostile environment cases, but due 
to the nature of the cases, the Court potentially created a different, more 
troubling problem by failing to define who qualifies as a “supervisor” under 
the new framework. 
B. Trouble with Defining a “Supervisor” 
Quickly following the holdings in Ellerth and Faragher, the importance of 
recognizing who qualified as a “supervisor” for Title VII purposes became 
readily apparent, and the lower courts were tasked with shutting the door left 
open by the Supreme Court.88 
1. The Narrow Approach 
In 1998, shortly after the twin Ellerth-Faragher holdings, the Seventh 
Circuit faced a case dealing with a hostile work environment claim allegedly 
involving the victim’s supervisors.89 In Parkins v. Civil Constructors of 
Illinois, Inc., the parties disagreed over whether the alleged harassers qualified 
as supervisors.90 The court noted that, unfortunately, Title VII did not provide 
a definition for the term “supervisor,” as that was a term used by courts in 
developing liability standards.91 Accordingly, without any statutory guidance, 
the Parkins court recognized that it needed to define the “essential attributes of 
 
 83. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 747. 
 84. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780. 
 85. Id. at 781. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 783. 
 88. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2443 (2013). 
 89. See Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 90. Id. at 1032–33. The defendant claimed the harassers were supervisors, while the plaintiff 
claimed they were only midlevel employees. Id. 
 91. Id. at 1033. 
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a supervisor for purposes of determining employer liability.”92 The Seventh 
Circuit concluded that supervisor authority consisted of the ability “to hire, 
fire, demote, transfer, or discipline an employee.”93 In other words, supervisory 
status hinges on tangible employment action authority—the power “to affect 
the terms and conditions” of the subordinate’s employment.94 
In subsequent opinions, the Seventh Circuit continued to apply the Parkins 
definition of a supervisor.95 In Hall v. Bodine Electric Co., the court applied 
the Parkins rule and found that although Lopez, the alleged harasser, “provided 
input into [the plaintiff’s] performance evaluations, and [] was charged with 
training [the plaintiff] and other less experienced employees . . . none of [this] 
is enough to bring Lopez within the definition of a Title VII supervisor.”96 
In Joens v. John Morrell & Co., the Eighth Circuit first applied the 
Seventh Circuit’s “narrow” supervisor standard.97 About one month later, the 
Eighth Circuit encountered the issue of supervisor status again in Weyers v. 
Lear Operations Corp. and reinforced its previous decision from Joens by 
once again upholding the strict definition.98 In Weyers, the alleged harasser 
recommended the defendant’s termination, but the court found that because the 
alleged harasser himself did not have the requisite authority to make the final 
decision to terminate the defendant, he was not a supervisor.99 
2. The Broad Approach 
Nevertheless, while the Eighth Circuit decided to follow the Seventh 
Circuit’s narrow approach, the Second Circuit chose a broader approach, 
formally creating a split among the circuits.100 As discussed in the introduction, 
in Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., the Second Circuit concluded that supervisory 
authority is more encompassing than reflected in the Parkins approach.101 The 
court believed those who applied the narrow approach misunderstood the real 
question to be determined and analyzed whether the employee’s authority 
enabled or augmented their ability to create a hostile work environment, rather 
than whether they had the authority to make economic decisions.102 In coming 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. Parkins, 163 F.3d at 1034. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Hall v. Bodine Elec. Co., 276 F.3d 345, 355 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 96. Id. Even though the alleged harasser had an array of responsibilities, she did not have the 
power to make tangible employment decisions, and therefore did not qualify as a supervisor. Id. 
 97. See Joens v. John Morrell & Co., 354 F.3d 938, 940 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 98. Weyers v. Lear Operations Corp., 359 F.3d 1049, 1056–57 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 99. Id. at 1057. 
 100. Id. at 1056; see also Muse, supra note 9, at 503. 
 101. Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 126 (2d Cir. 2003); see also supra notes 1–9 
and accompanying text. 
 102. Mack, 326 F.3d at 126. 
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to this conclusion, the Second Circuit adopted the EEOC’s definition of a 
supervisor, which stated that “ʻ[a]n individual qualifies as an employee’s 
‘supervisor’ if: (a) the individual has the authority to undertake or recommend 
tangible employment decisions affecting the employee; or (b) [t]he individual 
has authority to direct the employee’s daily work activities.’”103 
The Fourth Circuit embraced the broad approach set forth in Mack, adding 
another circuit to the split.104 It was not until Vance v. Ball State University 
that the Supreme Court would finally answer the question of who qualifies as a 
supervisor for vicarious liability purposes under Title VII.105 
III.  THE SUPREME COURT DEFINES A SUPERVISOR 
A. Background 
In 1989, Maetta Vance, an African American female, began working for 
Ball State University as a substitute server in the University Banquet and 
Catering division of Dining Services.106 Two years later, Vance was promoted 
to a part-time catering position, and, as her career progressed, she became a 
full-time catering assistant in 2007.107 
However, between promotions, Vance had issues with a fellow Ball State 
University employee, Saundra Davis.108 Saundra Davis, a white catering 
specialist, served in the same Banquet and Catering division as Vance.109 A 
catering specialist has more authority within the Banquet and Catering division 
than part-time catering employees, but does not possess the power to “hire, 
fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline [part-time catering 
employees].”110 In 2001, Davis struck Vance on the back of the head after the 
two were discussing work-related matters.111 During this discussion, Davis 
became aggressive, began shouting, and slapped Vance as she turned to 
leave.112 Vance orally complained about this incident, but because Davis had 
been transferred to another department for other reasons, Vance did not file 
any formal complaints about Davis’s behavior.113 
 
 103. Id. at 127. 
 104. Whitten v. Fred’s, Inc., 601 F.3d 231, 245 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 105. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2443 (2013). 
 106. Id. at 2439. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Vance, 133 S. Ct at 2439. 
 111. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 646 F.3d 461, 465 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
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Nevertheless, four years later, Davis returned to Vance’s department, and 
controversy returned as well.114 On September 23, 2005, Davis blocked Vance 
from exiting an elevator, and said to her, “I’ll do it again,” seemingly referring 
to the 2001 incident.115 Vance took action, and on October 17, 2005, she 
requested a complaint form from University Compliance, orally complaining 
about the slap from four years prior, and in early November, she filed her 
complaint about the recent elevator incident with Davis.116 In response, Ball 
State investigated the complaint, which revealed contradictory stories of what 
happened.117 The University decided the best way to resolve this issue would 
be to subject both employees to counseling about respect in the workplace, and 
no one was formally disciplined.118 Specifically, Vance was lectured regarding 
communicating respectfully in the workplace, but it is unclear whether a 
similar conversation ever took place with Davis.119 Shortly thereafter, Vance 
overheard Davis using the terms “Sambo” and “Buckwheat” while conversing 
with a fellow employee, and Vance believed these words were “be[ing] used in 
a racially derogatory way.”120 
Apparently having reached a boiling point, Vance filed charges with the 
EEOC in late 2005 and early 2006, alleging various forms of discrimination.121 
These complaints accused Davis of “glaring at her, slamming pots and pans 
around her, and [generally] intimidating her,” especially during the elevator 
incident.122 Ball State investigated the incidents Vance alleged but did not find 
sufficient evidence to take any disciplinary action.123 
After Ball State decided against disciplining any of the parties, Vance filed 
a lawsuit in 2006 in the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of Indiana, claiming, among other things, that she had been “subjected to a 
racially hostile work environment in violation of Title VII.”124 Specifically, in 
her complaint, Vance identified Davis as her “supervisor,” and alleged that 
Ball State University was liable for Davis’s racially discriminatory actions.125 
After both parties filed motions for summary judgment, the court ruled in favor 
 
 114. Id. at 466. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Vance, 646 F.3d at 466. 
 117. Id. at 467. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Vance, 646 F.3d at 467. Vance’s EEOC complaint contained allegations of not only race 
discrimination, but also age and gender discrimination. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2440 (2013). 
 125. Complaint at 5–6, Vance v. Ball State University, No. 1:06-CV-01452-SEB-TAB (S.D. 
Ind. Oct. 3, 2006). 
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of Ball State University.126 The court believed that because Davis did not have 
the power to “hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline” Vance, Ball 
State University could not justly be held vicariously liable for her actions.127 
Indeed, the court applied well-established Seventh Circuit precedent.128 
Vance pursued her hostile work environment claim on appeal.129 In 
affirming the district court’s decision, the Seventh Circuit disagreed with 
Vance that there was at a minimum a dispute over facts regarding whether 
Davis qualified as a “supervisor.”130 The appellate court referred to previous 
holdings from inside the circuit, stating that a supervisor is “someone with 
power to directly affect the terms and conditions of the plaintiff’s 
employment,” and this authority “primarily consists of the power to hire, fire, 
demote, promote, transfer, or discipline an employee.”131 The Seventh Circuit 
acknowledged how other circuits have held that only “the authority to direct an 
employee’s daily activities” is sufficient to find supervisory status under Title 
VII but declined to agree.132 In conclusion, the court found that Vance’s 
assertions that Davis had the authority to direct her activities or that Davis did 
not have to clock-in like other employees was not enough to qualify her as a 
supervisor.133 Therefore, Vance could not recover from Ball State University 
unless she could prove negligence, and the court found that she did not meet 
that burden.134 
Vance appealed the decision of whether Davis qualified as a “supervisor” 
to the Supreme Court, and for the first time the United States’ highest judicial 
authority would have a chance to answer the question left unanswered by both 
Ellerth and Faragher: who qualifies as a “supervisor” for vicarious liability 
purposes in Title VII workplace harassment claims?135 
B. The Majority Opinion 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s decision in a majority 
opinion written by Justice Alito in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined.136 The majority opinion began by calling 
 
 126. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2440. 
 127. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 128. Id.; see also supra notes 88–95 and accompanying text. 
 129. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 646 F.3d 461, 465 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 130. Id. at 470. 
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 134. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2440 (2013). 
 135. Id. at 2439. 
 136. Id. at 2438. Justice Thomas wrote a brief concurring opinion, in which he stated that 
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Vance’s argument “misguided” and “incorrect” and said her definition of a 
“supervisor” was not supported by general usage of the term, contrary to her 
claims.137 In noting that Vance correctly pointed out that the term “supervisor” 
could refer to someone who had the “authority to direct another’s work,” the 
Court pointed to a competing dictionary that defined the word in terms of the 
ability to take “ʻtangible employment actions.’”138 After an extensive 
discussion about how the term “supervisor” has many different meanings 
across business dictionaries, statutes, and legal authorities,139 the Court came to 
the conclusion that “the term ‘supervisor’ has varying meanings both in 
colloquial usage and in the law.”140 As a result of this conclusion, the Court 
believed it would be incorrect to approach “supervisor” as if it were a statutory 
term; instead, the proper way to understand the term would be to “consider the 
interpretation that best fits within the highly structured framework” that Ellerth 
and Faragher adopted.141 
1. Reviewing Previous Decisions 
In the opinion, the Court reviewed the applicable agency principles for 
vicarious liability, reiterating that racial and sexual harassment likely fall 
outside the scope of employment, which would normally preclude the 
employer from liability.142 However, in Ellerth and Faragher, the Court held 
section 219(2)(d) to be an exception for situations when the harasser was aided 
in accomplishing the actions by the existence of the agency relationship.143 
This exception was found to apply in two situations: (1) when the harassment 
by the supervisor resulted in tangible employment actions, and (2) when it did 
not result in tangible employment actions, but only a hostile work 
environment, the employer could be vicariously liable if it failed to establish an 
affirmative defense.144 The Court believed it would be too extreme to make 
employers strictly liable whenever a supervisor engaged in harassment that did 
 
opinion because it provided the “narrowest and most workable rule” for employer vicarious 
liability in harassment cases. Id. at 2454 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 137. Id. at 2444 (majority opinion). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2444–45. 
 140. Id. at 2446. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 2441. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2441–42. The affirmative defense the employer must prove is (1) 
that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any harassing behavior, and (2) 
that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective 
opportunities that were provided. Id. at 2442. 
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not result in tangible employment action and therefore decided to sanction the 
affirmative defense.145 
Continuing, the Court reviewed the supervisor characterizations from both 
Ellerth and Faragher but noted that because these characterizations were not 
disputed in those cases the Court had not been charged with deciding what 
degree of authority one must wield in order to achieve supervisory status.146 
Agreeing with the dissent, the majority reiterated that employees who had the 
ability to control their subordinates’ daily work were certainly capable of 
creating “intolerable work environments” but other co-workers were capable of 
doing so as well.147 As a result of this observation, the Court found that a 
negligence framework provided a better evaluation in situations when the 
harasser lacked the power to take tangible employment action.148 
After acknowledging that the Ellerth and Faragher holdings failed to 
squarely define a supervisor, the Court believed the answer was implicit in the 
adopted framework.149 The Court referred to language from Ellerth, and stated 
that “[o]nly a supervisor has the power to cause ‘direct economic harm’ by 
taking a tangible employment action,” and this authority falls “within the 
special province of the supervisor.”150 Elaborating further, the majority 
recalled the Court previously found supervisors to be “empowered . . . as a 
distinct class of agent[s] to make economic decisions affecting other 
employees,” and it could be strongly implied that the power to take tangible 
employment action is not simply a characteristic of a subset of supervisors but 
is rather the defining characteristic of the entire class.151 
2. Rationalizing the Narrow Holding 
The Court rationalized its holding as a concept that could be “readily 
applied” and would allow the parties, in most cases, to know if the alleged 
harasser was a supervisor before any litigation began.152 This could lead to 
settlement of the dispute, and, at the most, the issue would be ripe for summary 
judgment.153 Under the approach set forth by the petitioner and the EEOC, the 
Court believed that finding supervisor status would often be “murky.”154 
Indeed, it cannot be ignored that the current case is illustrative to the vagueness 
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 146. Id. at 2446–47. 
 147. Id. 2447–48. 
 148. Id. at 2448. 
 149. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2448. 
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 154. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2449. 
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of the EEOC definition, as both Vance and the United States, in its amicus 
brief, applied the same “open-ended” test for analyzing Davis’s employment 
status but came to different conclusions.155 Finding this discrepancy 
predictable, the Court noted that Vance believed since Davis sometimes led or 
directed employees in the kitchen, she qualified as a supervisor, while the 
United States believed the same facts not to be dispositive on the issue.156 
The EEOC definition of a supervisor was articulated in an Enforcement 
Guidance,157 which the Court referred to as a “study in ambiguity.”158 
Specifically, the majority opinion found that certain terms and phrases used by 
the EEOC—“‘sufficient’ authority, authority to assign more than a ‘limited 
number of tasks,’ and authority that is exercised more than ‘occasionally’”—
had no clear interpretation and would prove to be troublesome for courts 
attempting to apply the definition.159 The Court believed this ambiguity would 
force trials to devote ample time to determining the status of the alleged 
harasser and, perhaps most troubling, would be far more complex and 
confusing for juries to analyze.160 Failing to be persuaded by the argument that 
the EEOC’s approach is better equipped to resolve cases in which an alleged 
harasser only has the authority to assign unpleasant tasks (inflicting 
psychological damage), the Court said victims could still prevail by proving 
the employer was negligent in handling the harassment.161 Moreover, juries 
would be instructed to consider the degree of authority given as an indicator of 
negligence.162 More simply put, the Court believed the standard adopted by the 
majority, supplemented by sufficient jury instructions, could be equally 
effective in cases where the alleged harasser had certain authority over the 
victim but not enough authority to qualify as a supervisor.163 
The Court then began responding to certain claims made by the dissent and 
started by arguing that the “hierarchical management structure,” which the 
dissent assumed to be widely used, was outdated and replaced by an 
“overlapping authority” structure.164 Furthermore, the Court rejected the 
 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. The Government believed that it would not be enough to impugn supervisory status 
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contention that the adopted standard would cause employers to insulate 
themselves by scaling back authority given to certain positions.165 Lastly, the 
Court addressed the dissent’s analysis of previous Title VII cases that would 
have been decided differently under the adopted standard, but the Court 
countered that it was not clear that any of those cases hinged on the definition 
of the “supervisor.”166 Once again, the Court ensured the plaintiffs in those 
cases could have argued their employers were negligent in allowing the 
harassment to occur.167 
3. Application to the Case at Bar 
Finally, the Court addressed the facts of the current case, and held that 
Davis did not qualify as a supervisor under the majority view, and likely would 
not even qualify as a supervisor under the dissent’s more expansive approach, 
as there was “simply no evidence that Davis directed petitioner’s day-to-day 
activities,” let alone that she had the authority to make tangible employment 
decisions.168 
C. The Dissenting Opinion 
The dissenting opinion, articulated by Justice Ginsburg and joined by 
Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, advocated for the use of the EEOC 
Enforcement Guidance and believed that merely “the authority to direct an 
employee’s daily activities establishes supervisory status under Title VII.”169 
In coming to this conclusion, the dissent attacked the majority opinion for 
being too restrictive in its limitation of both Faragher and Ellerth, ignoring the 
realities of the present-day workforce, and disserving the “objective of Title 
VII to prevent discrimination from infecting the Nation’s workplaces” in its 
discarding of the EEOC definition.170 
1. The Modern Workplace 
The dissent, like the majority, recalled Faragher and noted how one of the 
alleged harassers, David Silverman, who was found to be a supervisor, likely 
would not have qualified as a supervisor under the definition adopted by the 
 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 2453. Possible evidence that plaintiffs could admit would be “[e]vidence that an 
employer did not monitor the workplace, failed to respond to complaints, failed to provide a 
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 168. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2454. 
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majority opinion in the present case.171 Generally, Silverman had the ability to 
“punish lifeguards who would not date him [by assigning them] full-time 
toilet-cleaning duty;” but, as the dissent pointed out, there was no evidence that 
he had the power to take tangible employment action against anyone.172 
Providing another example, the dissent cited a Supreme Court case from 2004 
where the Court referred to the harasser as a “supervisor” when he only had the 
authority to oversee day-to-day activities but nothing more.173 Acknowledging 
that these previous cases did not squarely resolve the definition of a supervisor 
but still provided guidance, the dissent believed the majority was blind to an 
“all-too-plain reality: A supervisor with authority to control subordinates’ daily 
work is no less aided in his harassment than is a supervisor with authority to 
fire, demote, or transfer.”174 Nevertheless, the dissent argued that the cases 
referenced still showed the Court had previously held that “in-charge 
superiors” assisted by the agency relationship could create a hostile working 
environment.175 
In addressing the argument over modern-day workplace realities, the 
dissent fortified its conclusion by continuing to pull from real-life examples 
involving hostile work environments perpetuated by individuals who were 
arguably supervisors.176 After discussing the situations, the dissent highlighted 
that the commonality among them was that in each case a “person vested with 
authority to control the conditions of a subordinate’s daily work life used his 
position to aid his harassment.”177 Interesting enough, none of the harassers in 
the examples given would have qualified as a supervisor under the majority’s 
strict approach.178 
2. Explaining the EEOC Approach 
The dissent then provided a more in-depth analysis of the EEOC 
definition, noting how the agency, being charged with enforcing Title VII, had 
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applied the definition for fourteen years.179 Perhaps wanting to clear up any 
confusion on the leniency of the definition it supported, the dissent reiterated 
that an employee “who direct[ed] only a limited number of tasks or 
assignments” likely would not qualify as a supervisor, as the harassing 
behavior is unlikely to have been a product of the agency relationship with the 
employer.180 On the other hand, someone with the authority of such “sufficient 
magnitude so as to assist the harasser . . . in carrying out the harassment,” 
likely would be considered a supervisor, and the employer would be 
vicariously liable because the authority it delegated to said supervisor likely 
enabled the harassment to occur.181 
3. Analyzing the Majority Opinion 
Turning then to an analysis of the majority’s standard, the dissent accused 
the majority of ignoring the “robust protection against workplace 
discrimination Congress intended Title VII to secure” by adopting such a 
restrictive standard.182 Indeed, the dissent argued the “workable” definition set 
forth by the majority was rather unworkable.183 In support, it noted someone 
who had the power to reassign another employee with “significantly different 
responsibilities” falls under the majority definition, but it questioned what 
might really count as “significantly different responsibilities.”184 This was just 
one of the deficiencies the dissent alluded to in concluding there is no “crisp 
definition” of a supervisor that could provide the “unwavering” bright-line rule 
the Court desired.185 The dissent buttressed this observation by showing the 
difficulty in applying such a strict standard in certain situations, such as in a 
pitching coach and pitcher relationship or the relationship between a law firm 
associate and a paralegal.186 In both instances, the former obviously has power 
over the latter but is unlikely to be able to take tangible employment action 
against them.187 
The dissent predicted that the adopted standard would undermine Title 
VII’s ability to deter workplace discrimination.188 According to the majority’s 
standard, harassment victims would be tasked with the burden of proving 
negligence on behalf of the employer in a case where the alleged harasser did 
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not have the authority to make tangible decisions.189 This is contrary to Ellerth 
and Faragher, which placed the burden on the employer to prove affirmative 
defenses, a reasonable task given the heightened ability of the employer to 
gather evidence.190 
4. Applying the Dissent to the Case at Bar 
Nevertheless, the dissent conceded that in the particular case of Maetta 
Vance, Davis would be unlikely to qualify as a supervisor under the EEOC’s 
broad definition due to the “slim evidence” put forth by Vance.191 The dissent 
concluded its critical approach by calling on Congress to “correct the error into 
which this Court has fallen,” and to restore the protections previously afforded 
in workplace harassment situations.192 
IV.  ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL 
The majority and dissent both made strong arguments, but which theory is 
best? The majority approach claims to have adopted an approach that can be 
resolved before trial.193 On the contrary, the dissent believes the question of 
supervisory status is on par with the question of whether retaliation or 
harassment has actually occurred and “depends on a constellation of 
surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships.”194 Both sides 
make a logical argument, which perhaps makes it illogical to deem one 
“better.” Therefore, this Note proposes an alternative theory applicable to 
hostile work environment cases. 
A. Support for Discarding the Distinction 
An alternative approach would be to abolish the need to distinguish 
between supervisors and non-supervisors when it comes to employer liability. 
Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit, one of the more influential voices 
in the legal profession, proposed the idea of discarding the need to distinguish 
between supervisors and co-workers in employment discrimination cases in 
dicta in Doe v. Oberweis Dairy.195 In that case, the alleged harasser, a “shift 
supervisor” at an ice cream parlor, was responsible for directing the scoopers 
and was authorized to issue disciplinary write-ups.196 However, he did not have 
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power to take tangible employment action against the scoopers.197 He was 
often the only authority figure who worked alongside the scoopers, and Judge 
Posner described him as “either an elevated coworker or a diminished 
supervisor.”198 Recognizing the support for classifying the alleged harasser as 
either a supervisor or a co-worker, Judge Posner stated that there was “no 
compelling need to make a dichotomous choice.”199 
Fast-forward seven years, and Judge Posner was again addressing the 
topic, this time while writing an article reviewing the holding in Vance.200 
Judge Posner found both the majority and dissent definitions to be “vague” and 
once more declared labeling the harasser as a supervisor or co-worker a 
needless task.201 Specifically, he stated: 
Cases of employer liability for workplace harassment of one employee by 
another can be handled satisfactorily without attempts at classifying the 
harasser—attempts further confused by dividing supervisors into those whose 
supervisory responsibilities make them “supervisors” for purposes of their 
employer’s liability and those whose responsibilities fall short: They are called 
supervisors and have supervisory duties, but not the right duties.202 
Furthermore, Judge Posner proposed a “sliding scale” to determine employer 
liability, which would hinge on the specific context of each case, such as the 
victim’s youth relative to the alleged harasser’s, among other factors.203 
1. A Hypothetical to Consider 
Judge Posner was correct when he stated there was not a “compelling” 
need to distinguish between supervisors and co-workers.204 Ridding cases of 
this distinction will be more favorable to the victims, especially in situations 
where the harasser may appear to be a supervisor, but does not qualify under 
the strict standard adopted by the Vance majority. A uniform standard would 
also provide more benefits than the standard set forth by the dissent in Vance. 
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Consider the following hypothetical situation: Two lower-level employees, 
Abe and Bev, hold the same position at their place of work—a major 
corporation; however, Abe has been working there five years longer than Bev. 
This seniority gives the impression that Abe possesses power and entitlement 
over Bev, even though there is no technical differentiation between their job 
duties. Abe starts behaving in a way towards Bev that creates a hostile work 
environment, but does nothing that tangibly affects Bev’s employment. Under 
both the majority and dissenting approaches, Abe would not qualify as a 
supervisor, so the burden would be on Bev to prove the employer’s negligence 
in order to pin liability on it. This could prove to be a very difficult burden for 
Bev to overcome, as she will be pitted against the unlimited resources of the 
major corporation. 
B. The Proposal 
The current framework, simply stated, provides that employers are strictly 
liable if any tangible employment action results.205 Furthermore, employers are 
presumed liable if a hostile environment is created by a supervisor and 
presumed not liable if a hostile work environment is created by someone 
without power to take tangible employment actions upon the employee, as this 
person would not be considered a supervisor, but merely a co-worker.206 
1. The New Framework 
Under the proposed approach, an employer would continue to be strictly 
liable if any tangible employment actions resulted. However, if a hostile work 
environment is found to exist, regardless of whether the alleged harasser is a 
supervisor or co-worker, the employer would be presumptively negligent in 
allowing the hostile work environment to exist. The employer, nevertheless, 
can rebut this presumption by showing that it exercised reasonable care to 
prevent and correct any harassing behavior, and the plaintiff unreasonably 
failed to take advantage of the preventive or corrective opportunities that the 
employer provided. Essentially, the employer still has the Ellerth and 
Faragher affirmative defense at its disposal—proving it was not negligent in 
failing to initially prevent the harassment or provide a remedy once it became 
privy to the situation. As previously stated, this proposed standard will apply in 
all situations, and does not hinge on what kind of authority is possessed by the 
individual responsible for creating the hostile work environment. 
According to this proposal, the employer will bear the burden of 
overcoming the presumption that it was negligent in allowing a hostile work 
environment to foster. This may seem like a rather harsh rule for employers to 
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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
962 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:939 
cope with, and while that argument is not without merit, it is not entirely true. 
Employees still have to satisfy the steep burden of establishing that the 
harassment complained of was so severe and pervasive that it created an 
actionable hostile environment.207 Therefore, it logically follows that if the 
harassing conduct was so severe and pervasive, then the employer likely knew 
or should have known about it, and should have made an effort to stop or 
prevent it. The employers are fairly tasked with explaining the hostile 
environment and whether or not it properly handled the situation. 
a. Presumptions Generally 
Since this proposal is framed as a rebuttable presumption, it is important to 
understand how “presumptions” work in grasping this standard. A presumption 
is a “court-made device that says that if a party can prove certain . . . facts, the 
court will conclude that an additional fact exists.”208 Here, the “certain facts” 
proven would be the plaintiff’s prima facie case showing a hostile work 
environment, and the presumed “additional existing fact” would be that the 
employer was negligent in allowing the hostile environment. Fundamentally, a 
presumption is a “legally mandated conclusion which follows from certain 
specific facts.”209 A classic example follows: 
[I]f A is proved then B is presumed to be true. Once B is presumed to be true, 
and if the presumption is rebuttable, the opposing party must now produce 
evidence that B is not true, even though the party who produced evidence of A 
produced no evidence of B.210 
Therefore, referring back to the hypothetical about Abe and Bev, after Bev 
proves her prima facie case, regardless of the fact that Abe is only a co-worker, 
the employer would be presumptively negligent, and the burden would fall on 
it to prove otherwise, instead of saddling Bev with the task.211 
C. Implications of Adopting the Proposal 
There are practical reasons for this proposal, as the employer is truly in 
“the best position to know what remedial procedures it offers to employees and 
how those procedures operate.”212 Allocating the burden of proof is extremely 
important in the United States legal system, and often can have a significant 
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 209. Id. 
 210. Id. In the above example, applied to the current situation, “A” is the hostile work 
environment, and “B” is the employer’s negligence. 
 211. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
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impact on the outcome of cases.213 Factual disputes are at the heart of a 
plethora of discrimination cases,214 and under the proposed approach, there 
will likely still be disputes regarding whether or not the employer was 
negligent. Fortunately, however, there will not be the added factual disputes 
over whether the alleged harasser was a supervisor or co-worker. As multiple 
authorities have previously identified, there is a not a single dominant principle 
when it comes to deciding how to allocate the burden of proof.215 However, 
some important factors include “issues of policy, convenience, fairness, and 
probability.”216 It is undoubtedly more convenient and fair for the employer to 
prove that it was not negligent in the handling of the hostile work environment 
than it would be for the employee to prove the opposite. 
Forcing a presumption of negligence on the employer could exponentially 
benefit the modern workplace. As Justice Ginsburg has understood, “[w]hen 
employers know they will be answerable for the injuries a harassing jobsite 
boss inflicts, their incentive to provide preventative instruction is 
heightened.”217 However, under the proposed standard, Justice Ginsburg’s 
observation not only applies to jobsite bosses but to regular employees as well. 
This will encourage employers to be extremely careful in hiring practices, 
remedial procedures, and general overseeing of the entire staff. Employers will 
make sure to do everything in their power to be able to produce a solid 
argument in response to potentially being found presumptively negligent when 
any type of hostile environment exists at their workplace. While this may be 
somewhat of a harsh standard, the benefits largely outweigh the negatives. 
D. Applying the Proposal to the Case at Bar 
Applying the proposed standard to the Vance fact-pattern, Ball State 
University would likely be successful in rebutting the presumption of 
negligence. Ball State investigated the complaints made by Vance, and 
although it decided against discipline, the University still did its due diligence 
in addressing the situation.218 It is important to note that the burden would rest 
with Ball State in providing the evidence of its investigations and remedial 
procedures, as Maetta Vance would only need to prove her prima facie case. 
Under this standard, the parties would need not spend time and money arguing 
over whether or not Davis qualified as a supervisor and could devote their 
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resources to litigating the actual merits of the case. Thus, this case is 
illustrative of the notion that the proposed standard is fair to both sides—even 
though it appears rather strict for employers at first impression, it will provide 
justice in all situations. 
CONCLUSION 
Vicarious liability for the actions of supervisors has been a very fluid area 
of law for the past quarter-century. In the landmark decisions of Ellerth and 
Faragher, the Supreme Court held that agency principles apply in attaching 
vicarious liability, but due to the broad-sweeping nature of the “aided by the 
agency relationship” concept, which would attach vicarious liability to 
employers in virtually all scenarios, the Court created an affirmative defense to 
serve as a limitation to employer liability. However, what the Court failed to 
hold—the requirements to qualify as a supervisor—proved to cause 
shockwaves through the lower courts who tried to apply the standard from 
Ellerth and Faragher. Attempting to define who qualified as a supervisor, the 
circuits became split on whether an individual needed to have the authority to 
take tangible employment actions against another to be considered a supervisor 
or rather only needed the ability to direct the day-to-day activities of others. 
These conflicting views are what led to the decision in Vance, where the 
Supreme Court was finally able to address the circuit split. 
It is as curious as it is troubling for exactly why the Supreme Court in 
Ellerth and Faragher did not address the issue of who definitively qualifies as 
a supervisor, as a simple reading of those opinions reveals that the status of the 
harasser is essentially a cornerstone to the whole standard. The logical reason 
appears to be that because the parties did not dispute the status of the harassers, 
the Court was not required to address the topic. However, the Supreme Court 
seems to have developed a pattern of leaving important questions open, 
perhaps waiting until a “perfect” record arises to firmly establish certain 
standards. While this could be considered a practical strategy, it has proven to 
cause much difficulty to the lower courts in trying to apply the Supreme 
Court’s holdings. 
The alternative proposal set forth by this Note will do away with any 
uncertainty in regards to whether or not the standard for vicarious liability 
would apply. Eliminating the need to distinguish between who qualifies as a 
supervisor or co-worker will prove to be much more workable for the lower 
courts. Even though, technically, there should not be any more confusion in the 
wake of the Vance definition, it is still doubtful whether the Vance definition is 
truly the best avenue. This doubt is especially present in light of the very 
legitimate arguments set forth in the dissenting opinion. When two sides of an 
argument can both give compelling reasons in support of their stance, and 
when an alternative solution exists to eliminate the need to decide between the 
two sides, the alternative solution should be implemented. 
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Additionally, the proposed standard will result in employers being much 
more careful and diligent in hiring practices and workplace procedures, which 
can only result in a better workplace for everyone involved. Therefore, using 
the alternative solution proposed here, of eliminating the status of the alleged 
harasser as a dispositive factor, is one step in satisfying the goals of Title VII 
in creating a more equal and safer workplace, free of discrimination and 
harassment. 
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